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Post-Socialist Aspirations in a Neo-Danwei
The socialist-era danwei lives on in contemporary, ever-reforming China. Ironically, the pro-
cesses of reform helped to enable the perpetuation of the traditional danwei’s paternalistic 
practices by concentrating monopoly power in selected, partially market-listed, centrally 
owned enterprise groups. The Tarim Oilfield Company is an outstanding example of this 
balancing act between socialist and market structures—a neo-danwei. This article maps 
these structures using detailed ethnographic data gathered over two years working in the 
company. Multiple subjective viewpoints show that distinctions between different categories 
of employee are crucial to maintaining the danwei in the midst of marketization. Like the 
socialist-era danwei, the oil company produces dependency and constrains social mobility. 
Yet, amidst glorification of open competition and individual achievement, the desire to enter 
a danwei is as strong as ever. The certainty of danwei life is highly valued; stability becomes 
a status symbol.
Mary desired and resented status. We sat in an expensive coffee shop with a Western menu and spoke, in English, about the structures of life in the 
Tarim Oilfield Company, where she worked. The company is a Central State-
Owned Enterprise (Central SOE, yangqi 央企), located in the city of Korla, South 
Xinjiang. It is exclusive, accepting only a few top graduates each year as perma-
nent employees, and is widely recognized as “the best work unit in Korla” (Ku’erle 
zui hao de danwei 库尔勒最好的单位).1
To people outside the oil company, Mary’s institutional identity marked her 
out unequivocally as one of the élite, but Mary saw her position as a temporary 
* I would like to thank Andrew Kipnis, Luigi Tomba and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable 
comments on reshaping this paper.
1. This article is based on over two years of ethnographic research in Korla and surrounds, while I lived 
in the Tarim Oilfield Company compound and worked as an English teacher at the oil company school. This 
was an invaluable public identity, although I made no secret of the fact that I was also a scholar researching 
“Han Lives in Xinjiang”. While I did not personally know everybody who lived in the compound (population 
approximately 10,000), most people with school-age children knew of me. Almost all of the formal interviews 
were conducted in the last eight months of my fieldwork, after I had built up trust with key people; from 
these key people, I “snowball sampled”, and then cross-checked the interviewees’ responses during informal 
conversations. The interviews themselves took the form of life-histories, to engage the interviewee and allow 
facts and stories to emerge spontaneously as well as to give a sense of how different cohorts were affected by 
changing state policies.
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employee as liminal and unsatisfactory. Other women in similar positions were 
working as waitresses before they “married in” to the oil company, but she was 
educated at a good university and held a professional job before coming to Korla 
with her PhD-holding husband. He was sent to get some practical experience 
in Xinjiang, before returning to the headquarters of China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) in Beijing to continue a career in research management. 
Mary told me that they had decided not to take up an offer that her husband 
had received from a foreign oil company, because the behavior of expats in Bei-
jing had convinced her that foreigners were not really as “civilized” as her teach-
ers at school and university had led her to believe. Moreover, the competing offer 
from CNPC promised him rapid promotion and offered them both a lifetime of 
high status. 
Mary explained that, in the Tarim Oilfield Company, “your [employment] 
status decides everything”. She noted the “really quite different” way in which 
temporary employees are treated, compared to permanent employees: 
For example, a few days ago the secretary of my office told me to pick up a box of 
mooncakes before I went home for the mid-Autumn Festival. That day, I finished 
my work early, picked up a box of mooncakes and went to my car. Just then, my 
telephone rang. It was my leader. He said “You are not a [permanent] worker—you 
must return the mooncakes”. You know, now I am nearly 30 years old—I’ve never 
had that kind of feeling. I got tears in my eyes; my self-respect fell . . . I was hurt 
deeply. I was really, really angry . . . when I went back and met my leader, I shouted: 
“I don’t care about a box of mooncakes, but you need to be clear”. 
Mary noted that similar conflicts often broke out around her, and placed the 
blame on “the system of the company”. The following day, the secretary of Mary’s 
unit called her to announce that all temporary workers would also be allocated 
mooncakes, as a direct result of her “making a fuss”.2
In this case, “the system” created a problem of social stability to which manag-
ers clearly felt compelled to respond: disgruntled temporary workers have the 
potential to affect the permanent workers to whom many of them are married. 
Maintaining social stability is a primary requirement of any leader in China, and 
mooncakes are not expensive, so the response from the leaders seems explicable,3 
2. The phrase comes from a report by the Social Development Research Group at Tsinghua University;  
see “New Thinking on Stability Maintenance: Long-Term Social Stability Via Institutionalized Expression  
of Interests” (13 May 2010), originally published in Chinese in Nanfang zhoumo (Southern Weekend) on  
14 April 2010 (English translation formerly available at http://chinaelectionsblog.net/?p=5220, accessed  
16 May 2011), which suggests that “making a fuss” has become one of the negotiating tools for people and 
groups denied legitimate institutionalized expression of interests.
3. The institutional requirement to maintain social stability has always been particularly emphasized in 
ethnically complex Xinjiang, and this has been further accentuated as a result of increasingly frequent and 
but why the distinction in the first place? If such low-level conflicts are not un-
common, why are materially insignificant entitlements such as mooncakes so bit-
terly disputed?4 On the other hand, the angry words “I don’t care . . . but you need 
to be clear” imply an acceptance (albeit, perhaps, a grudging one) of differential 
treatment, as long as the entitlements and opportunities associated with different 
statuses are clearly defined and consistently applied. Mary’s reaction to the mis-
information, and then about-face, regarding the entitlement to mooncakes sug-
gests that expectations play a large part in attitudes to entitlements at the danwei. 
The expectations that employees have of the system, and whether or not these 
expectations are met, directly affect social stability within the work unit. Of par-
ticular relevance here are employee expectations of treatment according to status 
and opportunities to change this status through social mobility, and how these 
expectations interact with institutionalized constraints on such opportunities.
Yanjie Bian’s 2002 survey article, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social 
Mobility”, asserts that “post-1978 market reforms and the rise of labor markets 
[have made] social mobility a living experience for almost everyone”.5 However, 
as Mary noted in her conversation with me, even in this relatively high-status 
work unit, many ordinary employees do not seem to aspire to “move up the lad-
der” and, moreover, discourage such aspirations in other employees:
When I first came and used to recite English material, many people around me 
were surprised. [They asked]: “Why do you study? Your salary is not related to 
your labor.” If I work hard, at the end of the month I will get 2500 yuan salary. If I 
sleep in the office, I can still get 2500 yuan salary. This is because [the Tarim Oilfield 
Company] is a [state-owned enterprise].
The distinctions between permanent and temporary employees, and an apathetic 
“danwei mentality” among certain groups of employees, suggest that elements 
of the low-social-mobility “status hierarchy”6 of the Mao era persist in the Tarim 
Oilfield Company. Yet Mary’s husband has already been rapidly promoted and is 
apparently being groomed for an even higher position in the Beijing head office. 
The two members of this family live in two different socioeconomic worlds, a 
often fatal inter-ethnic violence since the Ürümqi riots in July 2009, see Thomas Cliff, “The Partnership of 
Stability in Xinjiang: State–Society Interactions Following the July 2009 Unrest”, The China Journal, No. 68 
(July 2012), pp. 79–105.
4. Mooncakes are materially insignificant entitlements, because nobody in the Tarim Oilfield Company is 
short of food or money, most people would be thoroughly sick of mooncakes by the end of the mid-autumn 
festival period, and these mooncakes would be all but valueless to pass on as a gift (they would be instantly 
recognizable as the ones given out by the work unit, implying that the giver holds the receiver in low esteem).
5. Yanjie Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility”, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 28 
(2002), p. 104.
6. Yanjie Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility”, p. 104.
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situation that raises questions touching on some of the key categories of analysis 
in previous studies of social mobility in post-reform China. Who has access to 
inter-firm mobility or career mobility within the firm? What is the effect of gen-
der on social mobility? How are transitions from “outside the system” (tizhi wai 
体制外) to “inside the system” (tizhi nei 体制内) achieved or obstructed? Struc-
turally, these anecdotes raise the question of what other socioeconomic worlds 
exist within the Tarim Oilfield Company. To what extent are vestiges of the 
socialist-era danwei still present? How have they been modified or replaced? To 
what effect? In answering these questions, I will also outline the possibilities for 
inter-generational mobility, since this is a key concern of oil company employees, 
and is closely associated with both expectation and danwei form.
My approach to these questions is to treat structure and agency as two parts 
of a continuing process, and thus as equally important—although not necessarily 
equally influential on outcomes at any given point in time. Throughout this ar-
ticle, I explore the formal and informal rules and structures of the Tarim Oilfield 
Company, paying close attention to individual reactions to them. I find that both 
the social mobility of employees and their expectations more broadly are influ-
enced strongly by both formal and informal systems which classify them into 
status groups with certain entitlements and opportunities. At the same time, and 
as seen in the above examples, employee expectations and actions change their 
environment.
DANWEI
The common statement that the Tarim Oilfield Company is “Korla’s best work 
unit” signals that many people in Korla think primarily in terms of “workplace 
identification”, rather than “the occupation of wage work”, when assessing at-
tained status.7 Faced with limited prospects for social advancement (or even 
material security), many young local women of marriageable age act this out in 
their preferred choice of partner. As a teacher in the oil company school, I was 
asked on a number of occasions to act as a matchmaker for local women who 
wanted to marry an oil company employee: “he can be divorced, that’s okay, and 
he doesn’t have to be good-looking, he just has to be kind—or even reasonably 
kind—and not too old”. At the opposite end of the educational-status spectrum, 
some of China’s top-scoring students in oil exploration engineering, geology and 
other relevant fields compete for acceptance into CNPC—one of the most eco-
nomically powerful (and, at the time of this research, politically influential) SOE 
groups in China. New recruits, predominantly male, strut proudly around the oil 
company compound, knowing full well that they have laid the groundwork for 
7. Yanjie Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility”, p. 105. See also Nan Lin and Yanjie Bian, 
“Getting Ahead in Urban China”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 97, No. 3 (1991), pp. 657–88.
their future economic security and privilege. A job in, or marriage into, the Tarim 
Oilfield Company is seen as an “iron rice bowl”, and more: the many expensive 
retail stores and entertainment venues in Korla owe their existence to the high 
consumption capacity of oil company employees.
The oil company danwei is at the center of the city of Korla, both figuratively 
and physically. It has both administrative and spatial dimensions—a fact reflected 
in its everyday designation, Tazhi (塔指), which means Tarim Headquarters.8 The 
oil company compound dominates the landscape over the river from the old city 
center and, since it was formally established in 1989, the company’s social, politi-
cal and economic influence has reshaped Korla. Korla is arguably now Xinjiang’s 
“second city” with regard to its political and economic profile, and it is by far the 
most modern and economically powerful county-level city in South Xinjiang. 
Notably, it was consumption by the highly paid oil company employees, rather 
than oil and gas production per se, that drove the city economy to these heights. 
Taxes levied on oil and gas production went primarily to the central govern-
ment, at least until the new resources tax law came into operation in July 2010.9 
Such vertical links continue to be of primary importance to the Tarim Oilfield 
Company: in the national bureaucratic ranking system, it is just one step below 
the province or ministry level, and one step above the county-level rank of Korla 
City itself. This means that the oil company is not directly subject to the author-
ity of the local government within whose administrative region it operates and is 
physically located. A number of people told me: “Tazhi, that piece of land, does 
not belong to Bazhou [Prefecture] or to Korla; it belongs to the nation [the politi-
cal center]”.10 Although certain plans and proposals must pass city government 
approval, the oil company’s bureaucratic status and economic clout mean that it 
is in effect independent of  local government. One thing which this partial auton-
8. “Tazhi” is an abbreviation of Talimu youtian gongsi zhihuibu (Tarim Oilfield Company Headquarters), 
and may be used to refer to the company or to the compound which it occupies. Thus, a person could say “I 
work for Tazhi”, or they could say “I am going to Tazhi”. The vernacular use of “Tazhi” almost always implies 
something of both of these meanings, for example, the sentence “Tazhi is hard to get into”.
9. “China Overhauls Natural Resource Tax: The Pockets of Local Governments Are Bound to Swell 
Quickly Due to the Natural Resource Tax Overhaul”, Caixin (21 June 2010), available at http://english.caixin 
.cn/2010-05-21/100146123.html (18 November 2011). A city government official told me that 50 per cent 
of the Korla City government’s taxation base in 2009 derived from the tertiary sector (retail, real estate and 
services), with only 50 per cent due to the primary and secondary sectors (agriculture, resource extraction 
and manufacturing) combined.
10. The Tarim Oilfield Company is directly administered (zhixia) by the Xinjiang oil management bureau, 
which is in turn overseen by a ministerial-level unit in Beijing. The city government is only the third player in 
the political government of Korla. The city government’s bureaucratic status is only county level (theoretically 
on par with the rest of the counties in that prefecture), compared to the prefectural-level statuses of the Pro-
duction and Construction Corps (bingtuan) and oil companies. Despite this, the city government takes deci-
sions about nearly everything in Korla City area which does not directly affect either the bingtuan Second 
Agricultural Division, the Tarim Oilfield Company or the military (which also holds prefectural-level rank). 
The latter three cen trally administered institutions make the decisions about matters on their own turf, and 
negotiate with the city on areas of common interest.
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omy means in practice is that the oil company performs a range of administrative 
and service functions which are officially the concern of government proper.
Tazhi is the youngest (most recently established) of all CNPC’s regional oil 
companies. The difficulty—due to both shifting-sands desert conditions above 
ground and complex geology below—of extracting oil from the Tarim Basin 
meant that exploration teams in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s all failed to locate 
and tap a viable source. The discovery and exploitation of the Tarim Number 
One well in 1986 is a point of great pride for the pioneers of that day, who are the 
oldest of the oil company permanent employees. Their success was made pos-
sible by imported technology (including desert-going Mercedes-Benz trucks) 
that only became available after the start of China’s reform and opening up. The 
desert’s unforgiving physical conditions thus played a key role in determining the 
historical moment of institutional emergence.
The Tarim Oilfield Company’s institutional structure was, in turn, influenced 
by the timing of its establishment. The reform era transformed China’s already-
compromised and internally contradictory social contract; among other things, 
reducing the workforce became both permissible and desirable.11 The Tarim 
Oilfield Company accounts for only 12,000 of China’s approximately 1 million 
permanent oil company employees, while older oilfields like Karamay (estab-
lished in North Xinjiang in 1954) and Daqing (established in Heilongjiang in 
1960) have over 100,000 permanent employees.12 Tazhi did not need to lay off 
staff to produce this relatively lean condition—building from a base of fewer than 
400 employees, managers had only to limit the number of permanent employees 
taken on each year. As I shall show, Tazhi is an artefact of the transition from 
danwei-type employment conditions to a reform-era type of social contract. By 
this, I mean that partial transition is embodied in the formal structure of the 
company, as well as in the informal structures of expectation and practice (the 
“moral economy”)13 that the company and its employees create in their interac-
11. Wenfang Tang and William L. Parish, Chinese Urban Life Under Reform: The Changing Social Contract 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 3ff.
12. The China National Petroleum Corporation (hereafter CNPC) employed over 1.5 million people at 
the time of its listing on the stock exchange in 2000. Even after recurrent layoffs through the early 2000s, 
over 1 million people were employed in extracting petroleum and natural gas in China by the end of 2008. 
See Ministry of Labor (ed.), Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian (China Labor Statistical Yearbook) (hereafter 
ZGLDTJNJ) (Beijing: China Statistical Press, 2009), section 3-1. In 2014, CNPC had about 540,000 permanent 
employees, see Renmin ribao (People’s Daily, hereafter RMRB), “Zhong shiyou Daqing youtian shu qian 
zhigong kangyi gaige zinü bao fenpei” (1000 Daqing Oilfield Employees Oppose the Reform of Children’s 
Guaranteed Job Assignments) (30 April 2014), available at http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0430/c1001 
-24959922.html, accessed 2 June 2014. The total number of people employed by the Tarim company, including 
contractor employees, is close to 30,000. Only 4,000 of the Tarim Oilfield Company’s 12,000 permanent 
employees are working directly under the auspices of the Tarim headquarters; 2,000 are attached to the 
petrochemical facility (Tashihua) and 6,000 to a small and old oil field in southwest Xinjiang.
13. For the original articulation of this concept, see E. P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English 
Crowd in the Eighteenth Century”, Past & Present, No. 50 (1971), pp. 76–136.
tion. The formal institutional structure is known as “the Tarim model” (Talimu 
moshi 塔里木模式).
The “Tarim model” is lauded as “completely new” and a “successful practice” 
on the official website of the Tarim Oilfield Company’s parent, CNPC.14 The lat-
ter claim is fairly well-founded, in economic and technical terms.15 Claims of 
structural novelty in employer–employee relationships, however, require a more 
complex assessment. A primary aim of this article is to outline how the Tarim 
Oilfield Company is similar to and where it differs from the socialist-era work 
unit, and how these similarities and differences in structure affect the formal so-
cial contract for different types of employees. 
DANWEI
Tazhi resembles a traditional work unit—a danwei. In the socialist era, a danwei 
“provided all essential services [including housing, food ration, education, et cet-
era], produced economic and political dependency”, and was the primary way 
for employees to interact with the state.16 In Tazhi, these “essential services” have 
been updated to the modern era and adjusted to an élite level commensurate with 
the company’s strategic and monopoly status. Along with the company’s admin-
istrative headquarters and office blocks, the Tarim compound contains a hospital 
with the best equipment in town, a school, a cinema, a cultural center with free 
or heavily subsidized activities, an expensive sporting complex and swimming 
pool, and even a city-district-level police station. Human and capital resources 
are concentrated in Tazhi. Although Tazhi is not an official level of government, 
14. CNPC, Talimu moshi—xie zai Talimu shiyou huizhan 20 zhou nian zhi ji (The Tarim Model—Inscribed 
on the 20th Anniversary of the Tarim Petroleum Exploration Campaign) (8 April 2009), available at http://news 
.cnpc.com.cn/system/2009/04/08/001232150.shtml, accessed 18 May 2012.
15. The deep and difficult-to-drill angled wells that are the norm in the Tarim basin apparently cost  
1.4 times as much as a standard straight well, but their yield is 3.5 times as much. See CNPC, Talimu moshi.  
Using official statistics of yearly crude oil and natural gas outputs and the labor force of the oil and gas 
extraction industry for China as a whole, along with Tarim-specific statistics reported by Reuters, I calculate 
that Tazhi produced about 7.4 per cent of China’s oil equivalent in 2010, with only about 1.2 per cent of the 
permanent workforce. See ZGLDTJNJ, section 3-1; Reuters, “PetroChina to Raise Output in Tarim Oilfield  
50 pct by 2015”, Thomson Reuters (17 May 2011), available at http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews 
/idAFL4E7GH03320110517, accessed 10 May 2012; National Bureau of Statistics (ed.), Zhongguo nengyuan 
tongji nianjian (China Energy Statistical Yearbook) (hereafter ZGNYTJNJ) (Beijing: China Statistical 
Publishing House, 2010), sections 3-4, 3-9; China Data Online, Natural Crude Oil Production and Output, 
2012, China Yearly Industrial Database, available at http://chinadataonline.org.rp.nla.gov.au/member/hyn 
/hyntshowpd.asp?hy=07&code=00413, accessed 21 May 2012; China Data Online, Natural Gas Production and 
Output, 2012, China Yearly Industrial Database, available at http://chinadataonline.org.rp.nla.gov.au/member 
/hyn/hyntshowpd.asp?hy=07&code=00420, accessed 21 May 2012.
16. Luigi Tomba, “Making Neighbourhoods: The Government of Social Change in China’s Cities”, China 
Perspectives, Vol. 4 (2008), p. 51; Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in 
Chinese Industry (Berkeley: University Of California Press, 1986).
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it is seen as governmental and performs many governmental roles. Offices within 
the Tarim compound provide services such as security, fire protection, hygiene, 
central heating, education, family planning and household registration. It is theo-
retically possible for an entire family to go about a normal life without ever leav-
ing the Tarim compound.
The oil company does not undertake the paternalistic and all-encompassing 
role of the socialist-era work unit for all employees and their families. Rather, 
it classifies employees into three basic types—permanent, contractor and tem-
porary17—to which varying degrees of entitlement are granted. Permanent em-
ployees, the true élite of Tazhi, are the only ones to get the full benefit of the 
services; contractor and temporary workers are not considered full members 
of the “danwei family”. Both permanent and temporary Tazhi employees have 
a direct employment relationship with one of the sub-companies of the Tarim 
Oilfield Company. However, temporary employees are not eligible for promo-
tion, and their insurance benefits are limited to the health, unemployment and 
retirement benefits dictated by national-level regulations for all SOEs. At best, 
these insurance benefits come out at about one-third of the value of the ben-
efits received by permanent employees of the Tarim company. The contractor 
workforce is employed by one of the many state- and privately owned companies 
that tender to provide specific services to Tazhi; these are known as “contractor 
service companies” ( yifang fuwu danwei 乙方服务单位; hereafter, contractors).18 
They must depend on their own, external, work unit for salary and benefits. 
Neither contractors nor temporary workers have the right to buy a (company-
subsidized) apartment in the Tarim compound. This classification system is 
called “three modes of employment” (san zhong yonggong 三种用工). Naturally, 
a hierarchy also exists among the permanent employees of the Tarim Oilfield 
Company. Although technical skills, level of education, length of service and area 
of operations are also important factors in determining remuneration, bureau-
cratic rank is the pre-eminent marker of social distinction here. 
The classificatory categories outlined above are not a new phenomenon in 
China. Forms of outsourcing were the rule, rather than the exception in cer-
tain large industries in Republican-era China; and SOEs used temporary work-
ers even at the height of the socialist era.19 Contractors are now once again a 
17. The CNPC website uses the following terms: permanent ( guding); contractor ( jiepin); temporary 
(linshi)—a “ ‘3-in-1” employment system (san wei yi ti yonggong zhidu). See CNPC, Talimu moshi. In the 
parlance of the Tarim Oilfield Company, permanent employees are also referred to as “contracted” employees 
(hetonggong). In practice, contract renewal for permanent employees is assumed; none of my interlocutors 
could think of an example to the contrary. My use of the term “contractor employee” as the English translation 
of jiepin denotes that they are employees of contractors.
18. The Tarim company is the Party A ( jiafang) to the contractor’s Party B ( yifang).
19. Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism, pp. 30, 48–56.
common phenomenon in workplaces across the country.20 There are specific and 
identifiable precedents for many of the component parts of the neo-danwei, but 
there are no examples in the literature of them all existing simultaneously within 
the one institution. The term “neo-danwei” implies a resilience of traditional so-
cialist forms of enterprise organization and its social structures, adapted to the 
new economic conditions. 
The core of the Tarim model is an operating principle known as “two new and 
two high” (liang xin liang gao 两新两高). The two “high” aspects are high stan-
dards ( gao shuiping 高水平) and high returns ( gao xiaoyi 高效益), while the two 
“new” aspects are new technology (xin jishu 新技术) and new company structure 
(xin tizhi 新体制). A senior oil company manager, Department Director Xie, ex-
plained to me that the term “high standards” means setting a high standard for 
employment of permanent personnel,21 and requiring of them that they finish the 
job to a high standard. “High returns” means a high return on investment. New 
technology means mechanization and computerization, with one of the main 
aims being to reduce the workforce: “In the past we would have about 30 people 
in the control room, but now we only need two. This technology . . . means that 
we can cut off lots of employees.” As he said this, he made a slow chopping action 
with his right hand, as if shearing meat off a doner kebab. 
The “new company structure” of the Tarim Oilfield Company is unique among 
the CNPC regional oil companies, and refers specifically to the practice of sub-
contracting tasks as diverse as exploration, high school teaching and entertain-
ment to “contractor service companies”. The primary reason for such a structure 
is to decrease the number of permanent employees maintained by the Tarim 
company, and thus reduce the amount paid out on retirement and non-salary 
benefits. “To maintain our current level of production, we employ [12,000] people, 
but if we used the old company structure, we would have to employ 100,000 peo-
ple”, Director Xie told me. Tazhi outsources on a far greater scale than any 
other regional oil company in China. Contractor employees account for 60 per 
cent of the workforce, and 75 per cent of the “Party B” contractors are not di-
rectly subordinate to the Tarim Oilfield Company. While it is not uncommon for 
20. Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, “A Chinese State Enterprise Under the Reforms: What Model of 
Capitalism?”, The China Journal, No. 62 (July 2009), p. 4.
21. Since the early 1990s, new permanent personnel have been sourced exclusively from among college 
graduates. Today, Tazhi takes only the cream of these graduates. The company smugly points out that they 
have gone from a situation where they “request people” (qing ren) to one where they “choose people” (xuan 
ren). See CNPC, Talimu moshi.
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permanent and temporary employees to work side-by-side in the same small team 
or work unit, the teams of contractor employees tend to work quite separately.
The scope of Tazhi’s outsourcing is also unmatched, and contractor employees’ 
socioeconomic status varies greatly, depending upon the type of services pro-
vided to Tazhi by the company that employs them (as well as their occupational 
position and their employment relationship with the contractor). Among the 
élite and the most highly skilled of the contractors to Tazhi are teams belonging 
to other regional oil companies—the teams set up companies within the Tarim 
compound and compete for tenders put out by the Tarim Oilfield Company. 
These teams are found in greatest concentrations at the “front line”—that is, the 
desert, where they work on exploration, drilling, production and “oilfield con-
struction”. There are over 170 teams from other regional oil companies working 
for the Tarim Oilfield Company, and they make up the bulk of the contractors.22 
These contractors employ both permanent and temporary employees, whose 
employment relationship is not with Tazhi but ultimately with one or another of 
the “parent” regional oil companies. The permanent employees of these contrac-
tors are well paid by their own parent company—as long as they keep winning 
contracts from Tazhi—but they are eligible for only some of the benefits of the 
Tarim compound. Despite the fact that some of these contractor employees have 
been living in Korla and servicing Tazhi since its inception 20 years ago, they do 
not fall under the paternal umbrella of the Tarim Oilfield Company. The profits 
of these exploration contractors eventually flow back to the parent regional oil 
company. In other words, much of this outsourcing happens between regional 
oilfield companies within CNPC. This system is made possible by the fact that, 
while there is much exploration and exploitation still to be done in the Tarim 
Basin, the output of many oilfields in other parts of China has plateaued or is 
declining. Consequently, many of the other regional oil companies retain excess 
employees, even in skilled occupations like exploration. 
Many contractor employees, however, are in far less lucrative lines of busi-
ness. Although these employees may enjoy slightly inflated wages compared to 
somebody doing a similar job for other local companies, many have no job se-
curity and receive little more than their wage in compensation. Employees of the 
contractors providing hospitality and entertainment services at the “front line”, 
for example, may be migrants from elsewhere in China, or may be locals, and 
tend to be young and ethnically Han. Still other parts of the Tazhi workforce, 
broadly classified (by the oil company) as “contractors” ( yifang 乙方), do enjoy a 
degree of job security, but did not choose to come to Korla. Like the exploration 
22. CNPC, Talimu moshi.
contractors, they were sent there by their company or institution; the company 
is usually linked in some way to the oil industry. For example, Jianghan (江汉) 
oil field in Hubei (run by SinoPec [Zhongguo shihua 中国石化]) has an arrange-
ment with the Tarim oil field to supply high school teachers to the oilfield school. 
Teachers of all ages from Jianghan generally come on three-year rotations. They 
receive very little extra salary, and if they refuse to come they lose their job back 
at the Jianghan oilfield school. For young teachers with saleable skills, quitting 
and returning east remains an option—especially for unmarried young women, 
or those who are recently married and want to have children. For older teachers 
who are close to retirement, however, quitting would mean a loss of their coveted 
permanent status at Jianghan, along with their retirement pension and other ben-
efits. These latter have no choice but to stick out the three years in exile.
The newly arrived high school teachers are broken in by sending them to pick 
cotton for between one and two weeks. For the physically weak among them, 
this experience borders on the traumatic. They return with welts on their arms, 
allergic reactions to the chemicals sprayed on the cotton, sunstroke, sore legs 
and backs, and darkened skin. The cotton-picking excursion is framed by the oil 
company as character-building—teaching the soft eastern urbanites how to put 
up with hardship. However, it is more often received, firstly, as a demonstration 
of the oil company’s ability to exercise arbitrary authority over the lives of these 
conscript-teachers and, secondly, as a crystal-clear statement of their “place” at 
or near the bottom of Tazhi’s internal hierarchy. 
The Jianghan teachers are housed in basic hotel-style accommodation, along-
side other seconded personnel (from petroleum research institutes and universi-
ties elsewhere in China, for example) and unmarried graduate employees (who 
spend most of their time at the “front line”). The building is not set up to be 
homely; it is simply a place to sleep between work shifts. All the people who live 
there are expected, first and foremost, to labor productively, and the rooms are 
equipped accordingly. A double room simply means two single beds. Very few 
rooms have attached toilet and bath facilities, and none of the rooms are set up 
for cooking. They are expected to eat at the nearby canteen. By doing so, they 
save on food preparation time (leaving more time for work) and reduce the liv-
ing space needed per individual. The combined effect of long work hours and the 
lack of a place to feel at home is that, during these secondments, workers have 
very little opportunity to build up their social networks in Tazhi or in Korla. The 
lack of cooking facilities is one of the most disturbing aspects of life in Tazhi 
for most of the female conscript-teachers. For them, cooking and eating familiar 
food is a central part of feeling at home, and they became very excited when my 
Canadian colleague and next-door neighbor invited them to use her kitchen. An 
entire troupe of them came over and cooked up a great variety of “comfort food” 
dishes. My colleague said that she had never seen them so happy. This depriva-
tion of private socializing space is, at a very personal and gendered level, part of 
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what it means to be a resident without full citizenship rights in the Tarim Oilfield 
Company.23
The seconded employees, the teachers from Jianghan being the largest group, 
are not “of the Tarim company”; they are simply being supplied (as if, or even as, 
a commodity) to the Tarim company in a business deal with another company. 
Although they have some attachment to this latter company, and may even be 
permanent employees entitled to full benefits, these rights do not apply to their 
relationship with the Tarim Oilfield Company. Tazhi has no paternal responsibil-
ity towards these contractor employees and, since they are seen as replaceable, 
they are treated as expendable.
Tazhi’s paternalism covers a range of benefits and services for permanent em-
ployees that surpasses what SOEs are officially allowed to provide. The popularly 
understood justification for this is the company’s location on the frontier, where 
certain services and opportunities are scarce or unavailable. In other words, the 
yardstick by which an acceptable standard of living is judged is that of Beijing, 
not Korla. Aside from the cash salary, the benefits granted to permanent em-
ployees include an in-house pension scheme, supporting K–12 educational fa-
cilities and offering reserved university positions for their children, providing 
jobs for their spouses and, since 2008, making jobs available to graduated chil-
dren through an “internal entrance examination”. Note the strong focus on fam-
ily  members’ social mobility. These arrangements could be characterized as a 
form of occupational welfare, and they clearly produce dependency on at least 
two scales—first, of the family on the work unit and, second, of the family mem-
bers on the permanent employee.
The salary package that the Tarim Oilfield Company provides to its permanent 
employees demonstrates the all-encompassing paternalistic socioeconomic role 
that the company plays in their lives. Various sorts of bonus form the major part 
of an oil worker’s cash income. The largest of these is the twice-yearly “produc-
tivity bonus” (xiaoyi gongzi 效益工资), which can amount to 60,000 yuan yearly 
23. The school’s headmaster, also from Jianghan, is barely more privileged than his charges (the head tends 
to be a man, as he is responsible for keeping the other Jianghan teachers in line). When I was there in 2007–
10, he lived with his wife and his high-school-aged daughter in the same style and size of apartment that we 
foreign teachers occupied: 65 m², with a bedroom, a living room and a study, all small. The headmaster tends 
to stay for at least three years (one rotation), and may well be asked to stay for longer.
for an unranked permanent employee. A low-level cadre may get 90,000 yuan, 
and the bonus increases considerably with rank. In comparison, even the official 
average salary in Korla only reaches 28,000 yuan per year.24
A veteran Tazhi employee explained that salary is paid according to bureau-
cratic rank: 
It doesn’t matter if you work hard and he works little. If your bureaucratic rank is 
the same, then your salary is the same. It’s only in the bonus, when the leaders ap-
praise you, that the difference is made. But they dare not make it too big—they are 
afraid of creating contradictions among the people, and the people quarreling ( pa 
qunzhong you maodun, chaojia 怕群众有矛盾、吵架). So the total income differ-
ence is still very little [at the same bureaucratic level]. A little difference in bonus 
is enough to demonstrate the leaders’ recognition of one person and warning to 
another.
Even distribution of bonuses was the norm in SOEs in the early 1980s, and was 
at that time associated with “worker solidarity”. Solidarity was said to depend 
heavily on workers’ close personal ties to other workers and managers.25 Such a 
conclusion may be less appropriate for Tazhi, where distribution practices appar-
ently reflect workers’ aversion to criticism by others. Mr Tai, a Workers’ Union 
cadre who describes his own role as “making the workers feel looked after”, told 
me: “Loss is disgrace, but a gain doesn’t mean much to an already well-off Tarim 
employee. If you give them 1000 yuan, they won’t say much, but if you take away 
100 yuan, they will be up in arms.” As with the mooncakes, something expected 
and then taken away causes an outcry. Expectations are in turn driven by a 
strong sense of “natural” entitlement that is relative to one’s place in the hier-
archy. Workers’ jealous guarding of such (perceived) entitlements reveals their 
dependence on the company as their sole source of both income and personal 
legitimacy.
The productivity bonus is not paid after retirement, but the company runs 
an in-house retirement benefits scheme to supplement the nationwide scheme. 
Retirement benefits are just one of many examples in which the Tarim Oilfield 
Company circumvents national or PetroChina-level regulations to provide extra 
benefits to its permanent employees. Mr Tai explained that Tazhi set up an “en-
terprise annuity” scheme because the amount paid to any retiree by a national 
24. See “Shengchan huinuan wujia shuiping wen zhong you jiang” (Indian Summer for Production: Com-
modity Prices Are Stable and Falling), Ku’erle wanbao (Korla Evening News) (18 June 2009), p. 1. This figure is 
disregarded by most people, as misleading at best, if not a complete fabrication. The figure is supposedly based 
on the average salary of permanent full-time government employees, including teachers and other people in 
state-funded service units (shiye danwei), and therefore accounts only for people with employment relations 
with the state (on average, a much better-off population).
25. Wenfang Tang and William L. Parish, Chinese Urban Life Under Reform, pp. 128–32.
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retirement fund cannot by law be more than 50 per cent higher than the average 
retirement pension in the locality that they live—in this case, Korla. Because of 
their higher salaries, Tarim Oilfield Company employees would have had to pay 
more into the national retirement fund than do Korla townsfolk. “At the end, 
if the local average was, say, 1500 yuan/month, we could only get 2250 yuan/
month”—which would be inconsistent with the far larger wage differential. To 
solve this problem, the oil company set up their own in-house retirement plan, 
concurrently reducing the official salary ( gongzi 工资) component and increas-
ing the bonus as described above. The way that the retirement benefits scheme is 
set up also helps to explain the fairly even bonus amounts: a large proportion of 
the bonus is seen by company leaders and employees alike as a part of the entitle-
ment due to a particular bureaucratic rank, regardless of performance—in effect, 
the basic salary.
Education is significant because of the particularly high value which Chinese 
parents place on their child’s education and its strong correlation with status 
attainment in reform-era China.26 Inside the Tarim compound is the relatively 
small, but extremely well-resourced, Bazhou Petroleum Number One Middle 
School. Very few SOEs in China today play such a direct role in the education of 
their employees’ children. The school was eventually transferred from oil com-
pany to local government operation in 2010—almost a decade after the original 
ruling that prohibited SOEs from running their own schools, hospitals and other 
social services. The delay can primarily be attributed to parents’ (oil company 
employees’) extreme reluctance to cede the indirect control that they enjoyed 
(via the oil company) over the school: school leaders complained to me that, 
before 2010, they “could not do anything that the parents did not agree with”, so 
the transfer was “not all bad”.27 Despite the loss of complete ownership, the com-
pany still heavily subsidizes education for children of oil company employees. 
In 2010, construction finished on a completely new high school in Korla’s “New 
City District”, which the company then promptly handed over to the prefectural 
education bureau. Director Xie explained that education remains “a large por-
tion” of the non-cash benefits that the company provides to its employees.
26. Yangjie Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility”, pp. 99–105.
27. Most of those who thought that the transfer was “not all bad” were the decision-makers and teachers 
who had no employment relationship with the oil company itself. Both leaders and ordinary teachers who 
were employed at the Tarim school before 2002 were, or were made, permanent oil company employees at the 
time of employment (many of them had been transferred from other positions within the oil company). All of 
the latter to whom I spoke or whose opinions I heard of strongly opposed trading their comfortable positions 
in the oil company for the status of an ordinary teacher in the prefectural system.
Perhaps one of the most important, revelatory and socially complex benefits that 
the company provides to its permanent employees is guaranteed employment 
for their spouses. The latter are usually women who marry a Tarim employee.28 
Sometimes these are local Korla girls; sometimes the young man finds a partner 
in his place of origin; and sometimes these girls are service personnel at the ho-
tels and restaurants out in the desert where the newly arrived graduates spend 
most of their time. The latter category makes up such a significant proportion of 
the women who marry into the Tarim compound that there is now a minor in-
dustry in positioning young women of marriageable age in service jobs out in the 
desert. This practice of  guaranteeing spouse employment can be seen as the ge-
nealogical successor to the mass state-organized29 migration of young women to 
the borderlands of Xinjiang, Heilongjiang and Inner Mongolia in the 1950s and 
’60s, in order to provide wives to the pioneers of the Production and Construc-
tion Corps (bingtuan 兵团), the Forestry Bureau and other state work unit sys-
tems.30 The goal—providing wives for state workers involved in nation-building 
on the frontier—is the same. Only the tools have changed, from purely state coer-
cion to a form of market coercion augmented by the oil company’s state-granted 
monopoly position. The Party Secretary of one of two sub-companies which em-
ploys these women (post-marriage) explained: 
Our work unit’s main responsibility is not to seek profits. The main goal is to ar-
range [work] for oil workers’ wives. This is the form of our work unit . . . Every year 
they give us some tens of people to find work for. We just have to arrange work for 
them in our company, and as long as our company doesn’t go bust, we are doing 
28. It is apparently rare for the company to take on a new permanent employee who is already married. 
There may be no single overriding reason for this, but one factor is that the company employs primarily young 
male recent graduates. This demographic would naturally be predominantly unmarried. These graduates 
undertake one year of workplace training on probation, and are housed in dormitory-style accommodation. 
If they were married, the company would be obliged to provide an apartment for them to purchase and 
also to provide employment for their spouse. For young people looking for employment with the Tarim 
Oilfield Company (and perhaps many other SOEs in China), it is strategically astute to remain unmarried. In 
addition, a young man usually needs to establish himself financially and with regard to employment before a 
prospective wife and her family will consider marriage.
29. My interviews in Xinjiang and Heilongjiang show that “spontaneous” (non-state-organized) marriage 
migration by women from the inner lands of China was also a common phenomenon during and after the 
famine of 1958–61. Whether spontaneous or state-organized, a large proportion of these women became 
workers in collective enterprises that were attached to the large work unit systems, but were not eligible for 
the full range of benefits (such as pensions and health care) that their husbands enjoyed. Thus, the positions 
of state worker and collective worker during the Mao era parallel the positions of permanent employee and 
temporary employee in the present day.
30. I use the phrase “work unit systems” to describe state bureaucratic systems comprised of a large num-
ber of separate and all-encompassing work units under the administrative supervision of a single, higher-level 
entity—usually a Ministry-level Bureau such as coal, oil, forestry, agriculture and so on.
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our job . . . As long as this oilfield continues to operate normally, this practice will 
remain.
The Party Secretary insisted that other regional oil companies in China do not, 
and do not need to, take care of this aspect of workers’ lives as well as Tazhi does. 
It is necessary in a small place like Korla, he said, because there are few opportu-
nities for “appropriate” and well-paid work. Conversely, he argued, if male work-
ers at oil companies in large cities “can’t find an appropriate wife” with a decent 
job, then that is their own problem: “Nothing to do with the oil company”. The 
wives’ jobs are guaranteed as a social service provided by the oil company to the 
permanent employee husband. Conditions are quite good,31 although the women 
usually remain temporary employees.
The distinction between a male permanent employee and his temporary em-
ployee wife reinforces the latter’s dependency. I suggest that the initial decision 
(related by Mary at the beginning of this article) not to provide mooncakes to 
the temporary employees was not simply because it is an extra cost to the com-
pany. Rather, it was also driven by the perceived need to maintain distinctions 
between temporary and permanent employees. Permanent employees’ sense of 
higher status and their negotiating leverage in the domestic situation is reinforced 
by such policies.32 Furthermore, the exclusion of temporary employees from any 
entitlement to mooncakes may even be a validation of some permanent em-
ployees’ own feelings on who should be entitled to what and when—namely, the 
every day politics of distribution. The same pattern is then easily followed when 
it comes to managing and distributing other, perhaps more significant, entitle-
ments and opportunities. More broadly, and undergirding everything mentioned 
above, such distributions are a restatement of what everybody already knows—
that is, who is of the danwei family and who is not. Conversely, the mooncakes’ 
real value to the temporary employee recipient is in their symbolic inclusion of 
the recipient in the “family” of the work unit, and in the entitlements’ implied 
statement that the worth of the temporary employee is equal to that of the per-
manent employee whom they work beside—or are married to.
Oil company promotion practices also affect the career mobility, status and 
domestic bargaining position of women who are permanent employees. Daisy, 
a permanent employee teacher whose husband is a rising oil company techni-
cian, explained that women are rarely promoted to positions of leadership and 
31. The wives are paid about 1500 yuan per month, and at the end of the year they get between 15,000 and  
20,000 yuan as a bonus. This is still 25–30 per cent higher than the average fully employed person in Korla City, 
particularly as most of these women do not have any skills and only the most basic education. Those who do  
have skills and education are fostered by the company and put into positions of more importance and respon-
sibility. In this way, they may become permanent employees. The unskilled ones do light gardening work 
around the compound, teach kindergarten or do manual labor in an oil company factory.
32. Wenfang Tang and William L. Parish, Chinese Urban Life Under Reform, pp. 315–16.
responsibility, “because their first responsibility is to their family”. The expecta-
tion that women will perform certain domestic duties on behalf of their husband 
and child means that “oil company leaders . . . cannot make women work as hard 
as men. If a woman is regularly home late, it will be bad for the harmony of the 
family.” Managers appear to have succeeded in making this gendered inequality 
into something that is normal and acceptable, at least to the extent that it is not 
directly challenged: 
I think this is bad, but it is right . . . I accept my responsibility as a woman . . . When 
I was young, my dream and my goal was to work in a university . . . but now my  
goal has changed. Now my goal takes into account the reality of where I live and 
work . . . I used to think that my career was important, but now I’ve given that up 
and I live for [my husband’s] success and for my son; his success is my success.
Daisy’s sentiment was echoed by a number of other women in both permanent 
and temporary positions. Since they have no other option that they are willing to 
take, these women retreat into pragmatism. The notion that this patriarchal hier-
archy is a way of maintaining domestic harmony in the work unit compound also 
shows that the (almost exclusively male) leaders and male permanent employees 
perceive it as “the correct order of things”, and a sort of “benefit” ( fuli 福利) that 
they provide to themselves.
Educational level is a key variable for inter-generational social mobility in the oil 
company, and affects different micro-cohorts of permanent employees in very 
different ways. In mid-2007, the company revoked its policy excluding Tazhi 
children from employment with Tazhi and, in early 2008, held the first “internal 
entrance examination”. The company had been under pressure for many years 
from parents concerned for their children’s employment prospects, and aware 
that other CNPC oilfields have always had a system of internal recruitment. To 
be eligible for the examination, a candidate must be the first child of a perma-
nent employee of the oil company; they must not have accepted a reserved oil 
company position at university; they must be a recent graduate; and they must 
have done a four-year degree which is not completely irrelevant to the oil indus-
try.33 The first internal entrance examination attracted 23 candidates, of whom 
19 gained permanent employment with the oil company. This satisfied most par-
33. Fashion design is the standard negative example here. Tazhi children with qualifications of core 
relevance to the oil industry—for example, petroleum engineering, geophysical prospecting and so on—are 
accepted straight into the company.
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ents and is generally seen to be fair and reasonable.34 Quite a number of oil 
company workers noted that the policy “happened to change just as the leaders’ 
children were about to enter the employment market”. Some older employees, 
whose children had already been passed over, were exceedingly angry about it. 
The timing of this decision was not a coincidence, but it is not only about nepo-
tism: the oil company leaders were among the first university-educated cohort to 
join the oil company in the early 1990s; and their children graduated from uni-
versity around 2008. The abolition of the exclusion policy is thus closely linked 
to social and institutional assessments of the quality of education received by the 
children born to the earliest cohort of  Tarim Oilfield Company pioneers. Most 
of these pioneers were born in the mid-to-late 1950s, began work at an older 
regional oil company (like Karamay or Daqing) in the early 1970s, and came to 
Tazhi in 1986–87. Very few completed high school. This low educational level, 
combined with the rudimentary conditions of the oil exploration campaign in 
the late 1980s, means that their children also have a lower educational level than 
the oil company children who were born and graduated only five years after them.
The exclusion policy reflected the reformist ideals that Tazhi was set up with, 
while its abolition seems to demonstrate an ongoing and inter-generational nos-
talgia for the cloistered security and surety of the pre-reform danwei. Compare 
this situation with that of CNPC’s Daqing oilfield, which inaugurated a very sim-
ilar policy in April 2014, after over a year of decreasing production and profits. 
The crucial difference was the policy context: previously, Daqing had accepted 
any oil workers’ child holding a higher degree. Thus, while Tazhi’s implementa-
tion of an “internal entrance examination” was a concession to the permanent 
employees, Daqing’s implementation of the examination was a limitation. In re-
sponse, around 2000 Daqing employees and some of their children protested 
outside the company headquarters, accusing the leadership of corruption and 
mismanagement, and demanding that the examination requirement be dropped. 
The protesters expressed a strong sense of entitlement: “We are the children of 
the oil company; going to work in the oil company is as natural as returning 
home”.35 On the second day, hundreds of police were brought in from Daqing 
City, and the protest met with a forceful crackdown. Emotions were running 
high: one side saw the reproduction of the family at stake, while the other saw 
the survival of the corporation at stake. This was a collision between paternalistic 
34. In addition, Tazhi children who attain Master’s degrees in other countries are also automatically 
employed by the oil company on their return. This is a reflection of both the desire to internationalize the 
company and the perceived need to provide a way for permanent oil company employees to purchase a secure 
future for their offspring.
35. “Daqing youtian: shu qian zhigong kangyi gaige zinü bao fenpei zhidu” (Daqing Oilfield: 1000 Em -
ployees Oppose the Reform of Guaranteed Job Assignments For Their Children), Xin jing bao (Beijing News) 
(20 May 2014), available at http://www.baike.com/wiki/大庆油田, accessed 4 June 2014; Tian Chen, “Industrial 
Worry” (19 May 2014), available at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/861137.shtml, accessed 4 June 2014.
and merit-based ideologies of redistribution. The official line was published in 
the People’s Daily more than three weeks later: “guaranteed job assignments for 
children of oil workers have not existed for a long time”. However, the persistence 
of what the same author pejoratively termed a “strong oilfield complex”—a sense 
of entitlement that combines the danwei paternalism of the Mao era with the 
high salaries and extra benefits of the reform era—was a result of Daqing’s hiring 
practices, which amounted to guaranteed job assignments, irrespective of what 
the official line was or is.36 It is ironic that, with regard to inter-generational suc-
cession, Daqing is now trying to “learn from” Tazhi.37 
The example of the internal entrance examination supports Deborah Davis’ 
findings that shifting state policies strongly influence inter-generational mobil-
ity, as well as career mobility, within the danwei.38 Micro-cohorts still matter in 
contemporary China, and the effects of privilege or exclusion can reverberate for 
generations. As the well-known frontier saying goes, “If you give your youth, you 
give your whole life; if you give your whole life, you give your sons and grandsons”.
The complex social, economic and spatial distinctions that separate the oil com-
pany workforce from its social surrounds and make distinctions within that work-
force were emphasized and formalized in early 2009, with the issuing of “smart” 
identity cards to everyone who lived or worked in the Tarim compound. The card 
system is an accurate reflection of how the company sees its relationship with, 
and obligations to, the various sectors of its workforce. Socioeconomic and spatial 
boundaries had always existed, but prior to the card issue the social boundaries 
could occasionally be ignored, and the spatial boundaries had been porous. 
The “Universal-Use Card” ( yi ka tong 一卡通) is a technology that not only 
helps to monitor, control and differentiate the population, but also helps to cre-
ate a desire in them to be classified as internal to the system—and thus to be 
36. “Daqing youtian: shu qian zhigong kangyi gaige zinü bao fenpei zhidu”; Xin Lin, trans. Luisetta Mudie, 
“Police Crack Down on Thousands at Daqing Oilfield Jobs Protest”, Radio Free Asia (9 April 2014), available 
at http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/protest-04092014114529.html, accessed 4 June 2014; RMRB, “Daqing 
youtian jinnian yi qianyue 1075 ming biyesheng fei youtian zinü jin jiu cheng” (Daqing Oilfield Has Employed 
1075 Graduates This Year; Nearly 90 Per Cent Not Oil Workers’ Children) (1 May 2014), RMRB Heilongjiang, 
available at http://hlj.people.com.cn/n/2014/0501/c220024-21116664.html, accessed 4 June 2014.
37. Tazhi’s response to Daqing’s small hiring practices reform is yet to be seen fully, but it has already been  
signaled. A well-connected oil company manager told me in June 2014 that Tazhi’s internal entrance examina-
tion is likely to become more strict in 2015, suggesting that either Tazhi wants to stay one step ahead in the 
reform race or that the orders to reform hiring practices come from higher up (CNPC head office or SASAC), 
or both.
38. Deborah Davis, “Job Mobility in Post-Mao Cities: Increases on the Margins”, The China Quarterly,  
No. 132 (December 1992), pp. 1062–85; Deborah Davis, “ ‘Skidding’: Downward Mobility among Children of 
the Maoist Middle Class”, Modern China, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1992), pp. 410–37.
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controlled themselves. Universal-Use Cards allow the user to enter the compound 
through the security gates that lead to the public area of the riverbank, and per-
mit access to that user’s stairwell and use of sporting and recreational facilities, 
as well as acting as a debit card to pay residential management and utilities fees, 
to purchase goods from the company supermarkets and to pay for meals at the 
subsidized company canteens. Each use of the card—when, where and for what 
purpose—is recorded and compiled in a central database. Should the oil com-
pany leaders desire it, they could order the production of a constantly updated 
cadastral map of certain types of actions by the Tazhi population. “Legibility is a 
condition of manipulation”, asserts James Scott,39 and the information provided 
by these smart cards clearly has profound implications for the maintenance of 
social order.
Equally significant is the card’s explicit role in maintaining a particular social 
order by classifying and identifying their holders as either A-, B- or C-grade citi-
zens. “A” is the highest rank, issued only to permanent employees of the Tarim 
Oilfield Company; “A” card holders are able to use the full range of company fa-
cilities. “B” cards are subsidiary to an “A” card—they are for children and spouses 
of “A” card holders and provide the same rights as the “A” card, except that debits 
for certain services like the exclusive swimming pool must be credited through 
an “A” card. “C” cards are issued to contractors and others who need access to 
the Tarim compound for work, including the Jianghan teachers and the foreign 
English teachers. Besides access to the compound, the only distinguishing right 
that “C” card holders are entitled to is use of the company canteen. Bound up as 
it is with citizenship rights and an implicit hierarchy of worth, the card system 
immediately became both a status structure and a source of resentment.
***
The Tarim model, particularly the “new company structure”, is the key to en-
abling Tazhi to perform roles and fulfill responsibilities which appear, on the sur-
face, to be contradictory. Director Xie makes the Tarim Oilfield Company sound 
very much like a “market-oriented neoliberal” corporation in the US and British 
mold.40 In distinguishing Tazhi from the typical picture of a Chinese SOE with 
a massive number of employees and burdensome social responsibilities, he re- 
articulates company discourse. However, the social and economic value of the 
non-cash benefits due to permanent employees of the Tarim Oilfield Company 
would appear to undermine Tazhi’s apparently genuine attempts to shed social 
responsibility and employee numbers. These two apparently adverse character-
izations can be reconciled thus: rather than the many types of benefits under-
mining the streamlining effort, the streamlining effort enables the benefits to 
39. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 183.
40. Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, “A Chinese State Enterprise Under the Reforms”, p. 3.
be provided. At the core of the streamlining effort is the “three modes of em-
ployment” system of classification. There are only a relatively small number of 
people, either working or retired, who count as full citizens of the Tarim Oilfield 
Company. The streamlining is not a means to a single end, that is, greater profits, 
but a means to dual ends which are both important, namely (1) profits and (2) the 
provision of benefits to the permanent employees.
The structure of the Tarim Oilfield Company both distinguishes it from the 
socialist-era danwei and shows its origins in the mode of governance that the 
danwei exemplified. Tazhi is paternalism wrapped in a profit imperative. How-
ever, while some of the paternalistic characteristics of the Tarim company are 
surprisingly persistent, others echo danwei tradition in their purpose but date 
from the reform era. These latter, including the internal entrance examination 
and the in-house retirement benefits scheme, can be thought of as reconstituted 
or, in Harald Bøckman’s phrase, “the transformation of tradition”.41 Reconsti-
tuted  benefits take a new form that connects the world inside with the world 
outside, and exist alongside change and continuity. This dynamic combination 
contributes to making Tazhi a unique institution, a neo-danwei.
What might be called the outer and inner discourses of the Tarim Oilfield 
Company—respectively, corporate profit and corporate paternalism—converge 
in oil company cadres’ explanations of this system of distinctions and related 
benefits. Mr Tai argued that, in order to “attract and keep skilled employees, we 
need to offer these extra salary benefits, because Xinjiang is not attractive for 
people to come and live”.42 “We are profitable, so we are justified in passing on 
this affluence to our employees”, explained Director Xie, without being prompted. 
His argument unites the shareholder logic of the market with the “one big fam-
ily” logic of the socialist-era danwei, but it should also be clear by now that the 
operationalization of this selective paternalism is closely linked to certain inti-
mate distinctions, within the immediate family as well as between co-workers. 
These distinctions shape the sort of social mobility that is available to different 
categories of people associated with the oil company. 
41. Bøckman sets this against “the ‘transformation and tradition’ scheme”. Harald Bøckman, “China 
Deconstructs? The Future of the Chinese Empire-State in a Historical Perspective”, in Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard 
and David Strand (eds), Reconstructing Twentieth-Century China: State Control, Civil Society, and National 
Identity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 311.
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Expectations of social mobility among Tarim Oilfield Company employees are 
status-specific and vary greatly but, at some point, most people find their am-
bitions constrained—if not by their own aversion to risk, then by that of the 
company itself. The rhetorical question asked of Mary when she first arrived in 
Tazhi—“Why do you study? Your salary is not related to your labor”—highlights 
how little has changed from the ideal-typical danwei of the socialist era. To the 
lower-level temporary and permanent workers, “lifetime employment” means 
do ing the same job for life. The question was, of course, also a warning to her: 
“do not get out of line; do not rise above us”. Her co-workers were desperate to 
make her like themselves, as comfortably immobile as they themselves felt. The 
perception that almost insurmountable constraints affect their own social mobil-
ity, moreover, is not limited to lower-level employees.
Ren and Jing, a couple of middle-ranking cadres who have been with the com-
pany since they started their careers in the early 1990s, explained that they, too, 
are constrained by comfort, as well as age and educational level: “We work for a 
state-owned enterprise—it is extremely difficult to change locations”. They as-
sured me that they have little alternative but to stay with the company until they 
retire: “We would be hard-pressed to find any workplace that offered us condi-
tions as good as here—wouldn’t such a good workplace only accept younger peo-
ple, or people with MAs and PhDs? This is about knowing yourself . . . you can’t 
just run wildly all over the place.” The examples given so far in this article concur 
with a large amount of empirical research that educational level is a key influ-
ence on opportunities for social mobility in post-reform China,43 but Mary’s view 
(outlined below) demonstrates that education alone is insufficient. 
The dynamic tension between social mobility and job certainty is evident in 
the way that Mary views the career pathways open to her. Although she has a 
Master’s degree, she would need to become a permanent employee before she 
could be promoted. She complained that temporary employees get given all the 
bad jobs, no matter how well they perform or how hard they work. At the same 
time, as the wife of a permanent employee, she can never be fired. She occupies 
a position within the élite, but outside the core. She told me that, upon her re-
turn to Beijing, she hoped to get a permanent job with the oil company, but even 
this ambitious and well-educated young woman did not rule out staying on as a 
temporary employee. An undemanding, dead-end job is abhorrent to her, but 
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the security and relative prosperity remain attractive. Such an attitude is far from 
unique to China, of course, but the competitive nature of the employment market 
and an inadequate social security system constitute particularly strong incentives 
to seek personal material stability in the public sector. 
Social mobility beyond the oil company is available only to the most outstand-
ing (and courageous) candidates. A couple of examples illustrate this point. In 
more than two years living in the company compound, and with increasing num-
bers of employees wishing to get out of Xinjiang because of the rising inter-ethnic 
tension, I nevertheless heard of only one non-managerial employee who left his 
permanent position to take up a job elsewhere. Two different people mentioned 
his story to me, without prompting and with palpable respect in their voice, sug-
gesting that such action was something of a local legend, not a common occur-
rence. The “escapee” was a highly skilled technician who emigrated to North 
America. Only after arrival did he secure a job with a large Canadian oil firm, and 
is now apparently very well paid with “a large freestanding house” and “a number 
of children” (such are the symbols of masculine success). A second instance was 
Director Xie. A few years after I first interviewed him, Director Xie secretly quit 
his job to “go it alone” (ziji gan 自己干) in east China. “Going it alone”, in this 
case, meant moving into an executive position with a private oil-industry-related 
company. There was not much “upside” left for him in Tazhi—he had been there 
for 20 years, and had gained rapid promotion before being sent to get an MBA 
in the US at company expense, then further promoted soon after return. At that 
level of the Tarim Oilfield Company, however, his skills were under-utilized; 
higher positions in the administration were increasingly political in nature. Xie 
lay low and stayed incommunicado for six months following his rapid (but obvi-
ously planned) resignation, suggesting that leaving the oil company is no simple 
matter for that small proportion of employees who are in demand elsewhere.
Bureaucratic incentives to maintain stability also exert a strong influence on ac-
tivity, achievement and aspiration in the oil company. Tazhi is known to be the 
most strictly governed work unit and residential compound in Korla, and its gov-
erning practices blur the boundaries between the work and living environments. 
For example, renting out an apartment in the Tarim compound is a riskier propo-
sition than in Korla City, because the owner of the apartment takes responsibility 
for the behavior of the tenants. If the tenants breach a safety regulation, or an ac-
cident such as a kitchen fire occurs in the rented apartment, the apartment own-
ers and all the people in their work units, as well as the tenants themselves, will 
be penalized. They may, for example, lose one month or even an entire year of sal-
ary bonuses, depending upon the severity of the breach. This system is officially 
known as “joint responsibility” (liandai zeren 连带责任) and more colloquially 
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“guilt by association” (lianzuozhi 连坐制). The system of “joint responsibility” 
is an integral part of the social control mechanism within the Tarim compound 
and the oil company’s work units. A number of oil company employees indepen-
dently asserted that the leaders “put joint responsibility into practice whenever 
and wherever they can”. Although many of these employees seemed to resent the 
practice in some respects, most also reflected that the system of joint responsibil-
ity did serve a useful control function.
Along with safety and security, breaches of the family planning regulations are 
most heavily penalized. The careers of local police officers and work unit leaders 
can be severely compromised if just one of the people that they are supposed to 
be keeping an eye on exceeds the birth-control quota or causes a major accident. 
These two hyper-sensitive areas are said to attract a “one vote veto” ( yipiao foujue 
一票否决)—that is, one mistake in either of these areas is enough to stop a ca-
reer in its tracks. Hence, these areas are very tightly controlled, and all sorts of 
coercive measures (mostly, but not exclusively, focusing on penalties rather than 
rewards) are deployed.
Tazhi’s own imperatives of social and economic stability temper the ambitions 
of its employees, as demonstrated by Party Secretary Zhang’s story. Zhang’s first 
major assignment after starting work in 1992 was a poisoned chalice: he was 
sent to manage a failing chemical factory that was producing an environmentally 
harmful product that nobody wanted. Zhang had no capital and only antiquated 
existing equipment, but by slightly changing the product that the factory was 
making, he increased sales tenfold in the first year. By the time he left seven years 
later, he claims that the factory’s economic output had grown 52 times.
Zhang related with some disappointment how cadres’ promotion in the oil 
company depends less on making outstanding achievements than on avoiding 
outstanding mistakes. He explained that his leaders did not want him to grow the 
chemical factory further because “[they] seek only stability. There is no benefit to 
them of making [the factory even more profitable], and there is much to be lost in 
making it worse.” Zhang reflected on this situation, commenting that, although 
the speed of development is slower under this system, it does have the advantage 
of minimizing the risk of spectacular failures. Out at the factory that he currently 
manages, the conditions are good and the work is not hard, but he lamented the 
bureaucratism: “Anything that you want to do, you have to get approval from 
higher levels . . . You can’t just operate the factory as you see fit—that’s not okay . . . 
My feeling of success is not as good as at the old factory.”
In spite of some resentment from mid- to lower-level oil company employ-
ees towards the strict governance applied to them, controls are seen by this élite 
group as valuable—worth sacrificing some of your own freedom to secure. Both 
explicit and implicit discourses assert that only top-down control, strict security 
measures, hierarchy and rigid rules are sufficient to keep the destabilizing and 
unpredictable elements of society in check (including those close by and even 
inside one’s own work unit). Thus the Tazhi hierarchy and the system of “joint 
responsibility” are accepted.
The people who live in the Tarim compound are, outwardly, models of a har-
monious society. In this sense, they differ from the well-off residents of gated 
communities in Beijing, which Luigi Tomba described as one of the “most con-
tentious and rebellious social groups in late socialist urban China”,44 but they are 
also similar, insofar as the Tarim compound provides a tangible model of socio-
economic aspiration. Although the model can create resentment, its presence at 
least creates an opportunity for administrative rhetoric to proclaim that material 
advancement is not only possible but also happening in Xinjiang and, further, 
that stability and (therefore) material privilege owe their existence to CCP rule 
and to the attendant political assumptions and behavioral expectations. The mes-
sage is: if you want to be rich, you have to be obedient, high-quality citizens.
Many of the attributes that we associate with the traditional danwei are present 
in Tazhi. These include the gated compound, the all-encompassing benefits and 
services due to the permanent employees, the complex structures of dependence, 
the difficulty of getting in (and out) as an employee, and the low career mobil-
ity within the work unit. The oil company claims to have done away with more 
of the old danwei characteristics than it actually has. But there is more to Tazhi 
than being a replica of the socialist-era danwei. Tazhi has also abolished certain 
traditions, and transformed certain others. Market practices and the reconstitu-
tion of danwei-like practices render simplistic characterizations inappropriate. 
Established in the first decade of the reform era, Tazhi is an artefact of transition.
Expectations are formed within this environment. The formal structures and 
managerial practices of the Tarim Oilfield Company are more or less accepted 
by the various classes and ranks of employees, and sometimes they are even inter-
nalized. For example, the views of some women who see their place as “primar-
ily in the family”45 are shaped by the formal and informal structures that make 
them dependent by restricting, or denying altogether, their career mobility in 
the workplace. Second, even skilled male technicians and researchers do not ex-
pect to rise far in the hierarchy unless they switch to a managerial career; this 
echoes the old worker–cadre distinction.46 Third, Tazhi permanent employees 
expect that their children will be given preferential entry into the oil company, 
but their expectations are still lower than those of employees in the more tra-
ditionally structured Daqing oilfield company. Fourth and finally, among the 
permanent employees, bureaucratic rank is widely accepted as a justification of 
44. Luigi Tomba, “Making Neighbourhoods”, pp. 57–58.
45. Yangjie Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility”, p. 103.
46. Andrew G. Walder, “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order”.
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sometimes quite widely differing material and status entitlements. Maintaining 
the consistency of entitlements at each level of the hierarchy—rank-based equal-
ity—appears to be more important to the employees than addressing the un-
derlying logic of the hierarchy itself. Consistency and predictability are valued. 
For these employees, being judged “not inferior/behind” by a superior is more 
important than being judged as “outstanding/advanced”. I suggest that this is a 
direct reaction to the ranking system itself: they need to know exactly how they 
stand in relation to the people with whom they interact on a daily basis. They 
need to know what treatment, both material and social, to expect from these 
people, and how they are expected to treat other people—and even whether they 
ought to be socializing with them at all. The ranking system provides a clear 
guide to these social and economic ambiguities. Thus, part of the explanation is 
structural: rules create expectations.
Similarly, many people choose to follow career and life paths that are con-
strained but allow them to reach a known and, for them, acceptable status. The 
path is predictable and safe. Often, they are unable to move very far beyond 
this acquired status. Psychological and formal dependence on the work unit 
makes individuals more accepting of the rules that determine social mobility. 
Dependence makes people compliant, and is accentuated in Tazhi by certain so-
ciospatial factors: there are no employers out on the frontier, except other Cen-
tral SOEs, that offer benefits that are anything like comparable; and Han people 
who are in this danwei all realize that they are at the periphery of their own 
empire-state. With regard to their work unit status and material conditions, they 
have reached “somewhere”, but, culturally and spatially, they are still in “the mid-
dle of nowhere”.
This is one of the really interesting things about China—that people still re-
ally aspire to work in such a danwei, rather than in an environment where there 
is more potential for mobility and more capacity to shape one’s own career and 
identity. I favor the simplest explanation: people who come into the oil company 
(and other work units with similar attributes) accept the structures of depen-
dence and the constraints on their own future mobility as the price of privilege. 
Dependence allows the temporal stability needed for social reproduction; socio-
economic stability seems to be the most sought-after privilege. Such certainty al-
lows planning and social reproduction in a broader environment (contemporary 
China) that has a history of, and is still seen as liable to, rapid change. Privilege, 
here, equates to certainty. 
Individual, institutional and statist desires for stability converge in Tazhi. 
People seek certainty in an uncertain world, and many are willing to trade off 
against possibly greater potential: “a bird in the hand . . . ”. In this way, material 
stability itself becomes an element of status, something to be envied. The state 
and the institutions of the state seek social and economic stability to perpetuate 
their rule or their paramount position. Social and institutional reproduction, re-
spectively, are the nostalgic aspirations of post-socialism. 
